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Is	it	wise	to	decapitate	organised	armed	groups?
The	case	of	Colombia’s	Clan	del	Golfo
Demobilisation	of	this	armed	group	is	an	opportunity	not	to	be	missed.	In	a	context	of
FARC	disarmament	and	a	peace	process	with	the	ELN,	the	state	can	establish	its
presence	throughout	the	country	and	smooth	the	road	to	peace,	write	Juan	David
Gélvez	and	Michael	Weintraub	(Universidad	de	los	Andes).
•	Disponible	también	en	español
On	August	31,	2017,	the	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia	neutralised	Roberto	Vargas	Gutiérrez,	also	known	as
Gavilán	or	‘The	Hawk’,	second-in-command	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo.	This	criminal	gang	is	Colombia’s	main
organised	armed	group	(OAG),	controlling	more	than	45%	of	the	drug	trade	nationwide,	running	hundreds	of
illegal	mines,	and	boasting	a	strong	presence	in	22	of	Colombia’s	32	departments.
Most	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo’s	members	previously	belonged	to	the	now-defunct	United	Self-Defence	Forces	of
Colombia	(Auto-Defensas	Unidas	de	Colombia,	AUC)	and	various	guerrilla	groups	such	as	the	Popular	Liberation
Army	(Ejercito	Popular	de	Liberación,	EPL).	This	implies	that	its	members	have	a	track	record	of	criminal	activity
centred	on	drug	trafficking	and	direct	intimidation	of	the	civilian	population.
Could	the	Clan	del	Golfo	be	the	next	armed	group	to	lay	down	its	weapons?	(Sylvain	Liechti
@	UN	Photo,	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Empirical	evidence	suggests	that,	depending	on	the	type	of	OAG,	the	removal	of	high-level	criminal,	insurgent,	or
terrorist	figures	–	or	“decapitation”	–	leads	to	conflict	escalation	amongst	the	actors	involved.	This	is	because
lower-level	figures	who	are	left	behind	fight	to	gain	leadership,	or	because	the	national	or	local	government
breaks	the	status	quo,	leading	to	a	violent	backlash	from	various	different	actors.	As	such,	Gavilán’s	death	should
in	theory	have	led	to	an	increase	in	killings,	greater	extortion,	or	unprecedented	levels	of	mining	exploitation,
amongst	other	acts	of	violence	carried	out	by	the	group.
However,	the	actual	response	of	the	supreme	leader	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo,	known	as	Otoniel,	flew	in	the	face	of
this	theory.	Instead,	he	raised	the	possibility	of	his	organisation	handing	itself	over	to	the	Colombian	justice
system,	with	the	aim	of	also	involving	the	Gaitanista	Self-Defence	Forces	(Autodefensas	Gaitanistas,	AGC)	and
thus	bringing	about	a	comprehensive	peace.
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President	Juan	Manuel	Santos	asked	the	Minister	for	Justice	and	the	Attorney	General	to	consider	Otoniel’s
suggestion,	while	emphasising	that	such	a	move	would	be	an	act	of	surrender	rather	than	a	negotiation.	The
difference	is	significant,	bearing	in	mind	that	a	negotiation	requires	a	longer	timespan	and	the	implementation	of
agreements	–	as	with	the	peace	negotiations	involving	the	FARC	in	Havana	–	while	an	act	of	surrender	involves
less	onerous	processes.	Here	it	requires	agreement	on	the	handover	of	weapons,	the	informing	of	the	entire
organisation,	the	type	of	justice	to	be	applied,	and	how	sentences	will	be	served.
This	in	mind,	the	question	arises	as	to	the	future	of	this	particular	group.	Like	other	researchers,	we	take	a
pessimistic	view	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo’s	decision	to	surrender,	mainly	because	of	three	key	features	that	speak	to
its	heterogeneity:
The	diverse	origins	of	its	members	–	former	paramilitaries,	soldiers	and	guerrilla	fighters,	and	petty
criminals,	amongst	others	–	mean	the	group	lacks	a	clear	ideology	and	has	varied	interests	and
backgrounds	that	will	prove	extremely	difficult	to	address.
The	unequal	distribution	of	its	members	throughout	the	country	is	also	problematic.	Although	it	boasts	a
strong	presence	in	Urabá,	a	large	number	of	its	members	are	based	in	departmental	capitals	and	mid-sized
cities.
The	diversity	of	businesses	operated	by	the	Clan	del	Golfo’s	different	fronts.	Whereas	some	devote
themselves	to	drug	trafficking,	others	focus	on	mining	operations	or	extortion	of	large	livestock	and	oil
companies.
We	are	also	concerned	by	the	legal	difficulties	of	embarking	on	a	peace	process	with	a	criminal	gang.	The
Attorney-General	has	pointed	out	the	vacuum	in	Colombian	law	on	acts	of	surrender	by	organised	armed	groups:
1.	 There	is	great	difficulty	in	individual	identification	of	group	members,	as	the	majority	lack	ID	cards.
2.	 A	formal	declaration	of	surrender	is	required,	wherein	members	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo	admit	their
involvement	in	criminal	activity	so	that	the	Public	Prosecutor’s	Office	can	issue	an	arrest	warrant.
3.	 There	are	typically	long	delays	in	the	Colombian	legal	system,	where	a	case	can	go	on	for	more	than	two
years	without	any	significant	progress	being	made.
4.	 With	victims	having	played	an	important	role	in	Colombian	politics	after	the	peace	accord	with	the	FARC,
surrender	by	the	Clan	del	Golfo	would	create	uncertainty	about	how	victims	would	be	granted	redress	and
whether	the	same	forms	of	redress	and	reconciliation	would	apply	to	other	processes.
The	surrender	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo	could	help	to	silence	the	guns	throughout	Colombia
(Thomas	Tucker,	CC0)
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Despite	the	legal	and	political	challenges,	failure	to	wind	down	Colombia’s	biggest	criminal	organisation	would
come	at	a	high	price.		It	would	allow	for	the	regularisation	of	some	2,000	Colombians,	most	of	whom	are	young
men	living	in	poverty	and	at	high	risk	of	remaining	on	the	wrong	side	of	the	law.
In	a	post-conflict	context,	the	demise	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo	provides	an	opportunity	to	put	an	end	to	the	numerous
sources	of	violence	which	can	be	found	throughout	the	country.	It	would	also	enable	substitution	of	illicit	crops
and	the	entry	of	the	Colombian	state	in	more	remote	areas	of	the	country	where	it	has	traditionally	been	absent.
Yet,	in	order	for	this	gang	to	be	properly	disarmed,	demobilised,	and	reintegrated	a	number	of	risk	factors	ought
to	be	taken	into	account.	The	presence	of	other	armed	groups,	such	as	dissident	factions	within	FARC,	makes	it
difficult	for	the	entire	membership	of	the	Clan	del	Golfo	to	stick	to	any	agreement,	as	there	will	either	be
incentives	for	them	to	remain	involved	in	illegal	activities	or	pressure	on	them	not	to	abandon	such	activities	in	the
first	place.
Furthermore,	despite	his	Nobel	Peace	Prize	and	widespread	international	recognition,	President	Juan	Manuel
Santos’s	political	capital	is	limited.		No	fewer	than	72%	of	Colombians	disapprove	of	his	performance,	thus
limiting	his	ability	to	attract	support	from	political	parties	and	civil	society.
In	conclusion,	organised	crime,	and	the	Clan	del	Golfo	in	particular,	poses	a	fundamental	threat	both	to	the	peace
process	with	the	FARC	and	to	the	social	and	political	stability	of	Colombia.	Counteracting	its	criminal	activities
has	proven	to	be	very	difficult,	as	a	result	of	poorly	targeted	anti-drugs	policies	and	the	difficulty	of	establishing	a
state	presence	throughout	the	country.
Otoniel’s	response	to	the	death	of	his	second-in-command	is	surprising,	offering	the	possibility	of	bringing	his
group’s	conflict	with	the	state	to	an	end,	where	evidence	would	tend	to	suggest	that	criminal	gangs	or	drug
traffickers	raise	the	rate	of	violence	in	the	wake	of	“decapitation”.
Yet,	given	the	dissolution	of	the	FARC	and	the	ongoing	peace	process	with	the	ELN,	this	opportunity	to	establish
a	state	presence	throughout	Colombia	must	be	seized	as	a	vital	step	in	smoothing	the	country’s	road	to	peace.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	Translation	by	Daragh	Brady
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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